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SUBJECTING LAND COMMISSIONERS TO THE SAME STRICT
DISQUALIFICATION STANDARDS AS JUDGES UNDER 28
U.S.C. § 455
United States v. Werner, 916 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1990)
In United States v. Werner,' the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
disqualification standards for judges set forth in the federal disqualifica-
tion statute apply to land commissioners.2
In 1980 the United States acquired through condemnation land Robert
Stanton Werner owned.' In 1982, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia appointed a commission to deter-
mine the amount of just compensation payable to Werner for the prop-
erty.4 In 1983, Werner moved to disqualify one member of the
commission, Bradley Nash, alleging that he was biased against Werner
and, as mayor of a nearby community, had a conflict of interest in the
matter.' Nash, who previously secured funds from the National Park
1. 916 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1990).
2. Id. at 178. The federal disqualification statute is 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988). This Case
Comment is limited to whether land commissioners should be held to the same disqualification stan-
dards as judges. Whether a particular land commissioner's activities might persuade a disinterested
observer reasonably to question his impartiality is thus beyond the scope of this Comment. For a
general discussion on impartiality and the judicial system, see Susan B. Hoekma, Comment, Ques-
tioning the Impartiality of Judges: Disqualfying Federal District Court Judges Under 28 USC
§ 455(a), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 697 (1987).
3. 916 F.2d at 176. The United States acquired the property pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 258a
(1988) for use as part of the National Park Service's Appalachian National Scenic Trail. Id.
4. Id. The court treated the land commissioners as special masters to determine the fair value
of the subject property. Id. The district court made the appointment pursuant to Rule 71A(h) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "Before appointing the... commission... the court shall
advise the parties of the identity and qualifications of each prospective commissioner... and may
permit the parties to examine such designee.... Each party shall have the right to object for valid
cause to the appointment of any person as a commissioner." FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(h).
If the district court appoints a commission, Rule 71A grants the commission the powers of a
master provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(c). FED. R. Civ. P. 71A, 53(c). The com-
mission's "action and report should be determined by a majority and its findings and report shall
have the effect, and be dealt with by the court in accordance with the practice prescribed in para-
graph (2) of subdivision (e) of Rule 53." FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(h). Under Rule 53, a "master," such
as an auditor, examiner, or assessor, is under the control of the district court, which may adopt,
modify, or reject its report. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(eX2). Rule 53 provides "in an action to be tried
without a jury, the court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous." FED. R.
Civ. P. 53(e)(2) (emphasis added).
5. 916 F.2d at 176. In addition to securing funds from the National Park Service, Nash
donated land on prior occasions to the National Park Service. Id. In addition to his personal dona-
tions, Nash also was a charter member of the Harper's Ferry National Historic Park, which donated
occasionally to the National Park Service. Id. Werner alleged that Nash's previous and ongoing
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Service for various town projects, was attempting to obtain funding for
additional projects at the time the district court appointed him to the
land commission.6 Based on Nash's response to the motion, in which he
attested to his ability to render a fair decision despite his ties with the
National Park Service, the district court denied Werner's motion to
disqualify.7
Werner appealed the district court's award of compensation for the
acreage to the Fourth Circuit, alleging that the district court erred in
denying his motion to disqualify and replace Nash as a land commis-
sioner.8 The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new determina-
tion of compensation,9 holding that the federal disqualification statute,
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988), for justices, federal judges, and magistrates
applies to land commissioners as well.10
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is necessary to comport with due pro-
cess.11 Historically,' I Congress has sought to maintain public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judicial system1 3 by requiring fair
relations with the National Park Service raised reasonable questions regarding his ability to remain
impartial as a land commissioner. Id.
6. Id. In the 1970s, as mayor, Nash obtained two financial grants from the National Park
Service for the Harper's Ferry Police force and for the construction of a new sewer system. Id. At
the time the court appointed the land commission, Nash was negotiating with the National Park
Services for additional funding for a town water project. Id.
7. Id. The district court concluded no conflict of interest existed, based solely on Nash's
statements in response to the motion to disqualify. Id. Werner argued on appeal, however, that
Nash's statements amounted to implied accusations that Werner's counsel was a land speculator.
Id. at 177. Werner alleged that this evidence provided further proof of Nash's bias. Id.
8. Id. at 176. On appeal, Werner argued that the land commissioner should have been dis-
qualified because: (1) his duty as mayor created a conflict of interest, (2) he was personally biased
against Werner, and (3) his statements in the response to the motion to disqualify evidenced possible
animosity toward Werner's counsel. Id. at 176-77.
9. Id. at 179. The court held that Nash's attempts to procure financing from the National
Park Service, as well as his affidavits in response to Werner's motion to disqualify, constituted ques-
tions regarding his objectivity sufficient for a disinterested person reasonably to question his imparti-
ality. Id.
10. Id. at 178.
11. See U.S. CorsT. amend. V; U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV. See also In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488,496-501 (1974) (fairness requires not only an absence
of actual bias, but the prevention of a likelihood of an appearance of bias).
12. The first federal disqualification statute disqualified judges who had been of counsel for
either party. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 274, 278-79. Today, ajudge must disqual-
ify herself if an appearance of a conflict of interest exists. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
13. See Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HAV. L. REV.
736, 746-47 (1973) (concern for appearances necessary because judicial authority ultimately rests on
public acceptance of judicial decisionmaking). Public confidence in the judiciary will diminish if
judicial officers are allowed to make biased decisions and deprive individuals of fair and impartial
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trials in fact and in appearance.14 Acknowledging the congressional
commitment to impartiality in the judicial system, the American Bar As-
sociation ("ABA") adopted, in 1924, its own standards to govern judicial
conduct and disqualification.15 In 1948, with its enactment of section
455, Congress established subjective disqualification standards for jus-
tices and judges. 6 In 1974, Congress amended section 455, significantly
raising the disqualification standards for justices, judges, magistrates and
referees in bankruptcy.17 With the 1974 amendment, Congress rejected
the prior subjective standards" and adopted an objective standard
modeled on the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.19
trials. See Ann M. Janus, Recent Decision, Judicial Disqualification for Appearance of Bias-Jen-
kins v. Sterlacci, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1075, 1076 (1989). See also Comment, Disqualification for
Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges 28 US.C. § 455, 71 MICH. L. Rv. 538, 563 (1973) (to
maintain public confidence, courts should attempt to avoid any suggestion of impropriety).
14. See infra note 19 for the text of 28 U.S.C § 455(a) (1988).
15. Janus, supra note 13, at 1076-77 n.19-21 (citing ABA CANON OF JUDICIAL ETHics No. 4
(1924) (ethical code adopted to promote impartiality in judicial system)). See also Randall J. Lit-
teneker, Note, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236
(1978) (Congress enacted statute to safeguard impartiality in judiciary); Comment, supra note 13, at
540-41 (ABA Canon adopted in 1924 established the general standards for conduct in judiciary).
16. Prior to amendment in 1974, the statute provided:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he
has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so
related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his
opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (amended 1974).
17. After Congress amended the statute in 1974, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provided, in part: "Any
justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88
stat. 1604 (amended 1978).
The 1974 amendment substituted "'Disqualification of justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in
bankruptcy' for 'Interest of justice or judge' in the section catchline, reorganized the structure of the
provisions and expanded the applicability to include magistrates and referees in bankruptcy." 28
U.S.C.A. § 455, historic and statutory notes (West Supp. 1990).
18. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351,
6352. The prior statute made the "judge himself the sole decider of the substantiality of interest or
of the relationships which would be improper and lead to disqualification." Id. at 6352. The exist-
ence of both statutory and ethical standards, together with the uncertain language of the statute,
forced a judge to decide either the legal or the ethical issue. Id. at 6352.
19. The federal disqualification standard was amended in 1974 to conform with the Code of
Judicial Conduct and to promote public confidence in the judicial process. See Janus, supra, note 13,
at 1077 n.22. See also H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 18, at 6351. Congress intended the amend-
ment "to make the statutory and ethical duties [of a judge] identical and eliminate the dual stan-
dards that governed judicial conduct." Janus, supra note 13, at 1077 n.22. The dual standards often
conflicted, forcing a judge to decide whether to follow an ethical or statutory standard. Id.
However, the amended statute contained decidedly different language. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 455
(1988) with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. The statute changed the word "should" to
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Because the provisions of the disqualification statute do not include the
term "special master" specifically, courts have interpreted the scope of
the statute inconsistently.20 The circuits are split on whether the statute
applies to special masters appointed as land commissioners.21
In United States v. Certain Parcels of Land,22 the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered when a district court must disqualify a land commissioner, ap-
pointed by the district court to determine the compensation payable to a
landowner in an eminent domain proceeding, for bias or conflict of inter-
est.23 The court applied the same standards as if it had been considering
the disqualification of a federal judge.24 The court did not specifically
"shall," indicating that a judge must disqualify himself. Janus, supra note 13, at 1077 n.22. See 28
U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988). Most importantly, the statute changed the word "judge" to "justice, judge,
or magistrate." Janus, supra note 13, at 1077 n.22.
Subsequent to the most recent amendment in 1978, the statute now states: "Any justice, judge, or
magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
20. See supra note 19. Special masters are usually private lawyers, retired judges, or legal aca-
demics. Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoe Procedure, 137
U. PA. L. REv. 2131, 2134 (1989). Masters are appointed to aid the judge in handling a particular
case. Id. No standard exists for the appointment of masters, although Rule 53(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that courts appoint masters as the exception and not as the rule.
Id. at 2134 n.15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). In nonjury cases, Rule 53 provides for the appointment
of special masters on a showing of exceptional conditions, such as accounting pursuant to an assess-
ment of damages. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). See Silberman, supra, at 2134. See generally CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2604 (1971). In jury
cases, a court may appoint a master if the issues are complicated. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
Historically, masters assisted judges primarily on matters of accounting and evidence. Silberman,
supra, at 2134 n.18. In early federal practice, masters participated in all aspects of the case. Id.
Historical evidence indicates that although a more restricted role was originally intended for the
masters, under Rule 53, they now assist in trial, pretrial, and post-trial litigation. Id. at 2135.
Indeed, masters for accounting and damages are quite common today. Id. at 2133. See, e.g.,
Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 857 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1988) (accounting and assessment of
damages in a patent case); Hartwick College v. United States, 801 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1986) (master to
calculate attorney's fees in tax case, as well as to decide individual monetary claims).
Under Rule 53, the master must file a report, subject to a "clearly erroneous" factual review by
the district judge. Silberman, supra, at 2135 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 53).
21. Compare Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976)
and Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 860 F.2d 1168 (2d Cir. 1988) with Jenkins v.
Sterlacci, 860 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir.), petition for reh'g deniedper curiam, 856 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
22. 384 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1967).
23. Id. at 681. The court decided the case based on a subjective standard. Id. Since the deci-
sion in Certain Parcels, Congress amended the disqualification statute, adopting an objective stan-
dard. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
24. 384 F.2d at 681. The court relied on the general rule regarding disqualification set forth in
United States v. Lewis, 308 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1962) ("[D]isqualification is a matter for the
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rely on 28 U.S.C. § 455, but utilized a subjective standard that left re-
moval to the discretion of the district court, unless actual bias had been
demonstrated.25 The court held that the district court's failure to remove
a commissioner was an abuse of its discretion, even though the commis-
sioner was an attorney who had represented a nearby landowner in a
prior condemnation proceeding.26
However, circuit decisions since the amendment have differed on
whether the Certain Parcels standard still controlled under the new, ob-
jective and heightened federal statute.27 In Morgan v. Kerrigan,28 the
First Circuit held that special masters need not comply with the strict
disqualification standards applicable to judges because masters are sub-
ject to the control of the district court.29 In Morgan, the court affirmed
the district court's denial of a motion to disqualify masters appointed to
formulate a school desegregation plan, despite the masters' previous asso-
ciation with the school.3 0 The court did not apply the disqualification
standards for judges, concluding that more relaxed standards applied to
masters and experts because the court controlled the masters.3" The
court emphasized the crucial need to hire individuals with expertise in
specific subject matters as a reason to lower the standard.32
exercise of discretion by the district judge, unless actual bias has been demonstrated beyond reason-
able possibility of disagreement.").
25. 384 F.2d at 681 ("where matters are committed to the sound discretion of the district judge,
the exercise of his discretion will not be disturbed unless [abused]").
26. Id. at 677. Because a subjective standard applied, the court of appeals upheld the district
judge's ruling that no actual bias existed. Id. at 681.
27. United States v. Werner, 916 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1990) (since Certain Parcels, Congress
has heightened the disqualification standards).
28. 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
29. Id. at 426.
30. d. The defendants objected to the masters' association with the Harvard University Grad-
uate School of Education. They argued that the masters should be disqualified because they were
indirectly related to the Harvard Center for Law and Education, three of whose attorneys repre-
sented the plaintiffs in this case. Id. The challengers also objected to two other masters who sup-
ported the NAACP, which, although not a party to the action, supported the plaintiffs' suit and
advanced funds to cover disbursements. Id. The court found the masters' relationships attenuated
and denied the motion to disqualify. Id.
31. Id. at 426-47. The court found that even if it applied the stricter standards, the masters
acted impartially in proposing their desegregation plan, and the district court did not err in denying
the defendants' motion. Id.
32. Id. at 426. Because the case involved complex administration of a desegregation plan, con-
cerns for the efficient use of judicial resources may have influenced the court's decision to apply a
lower standard and reject the motion to disqualify. See Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial
Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 662, 664 (1985)
("excessive disqualification would seriously damage the efficient administration ofjustice"). See also
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Similarly, in Rios v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters Local 638, 3
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the strict disqualifi-
cation standards of section 455(a) do not apply to special masters.34 In
Rios, the court affirmed the district court's refusal to disqualify the Ad-
ministrator's Designee,35 who was responsible for determining back-pay
in an EEOC employment discrimination action against a union.36 The
court held that, because Congress did not include special masters in its
1974 general revision of section 455,37 Congress did not intend to apply
the strict standard to court-appointed masters. 38 According to the court,
less stringent disqualification standards should apply because the district
court adequately controls masters and evaluates their conclusions.39
Both Rios and Morgan refused to apply the judicial disqualification
standards to special masters.' In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit recently rejected these approaches. In Jen-
kins v. Sterlacci,41 the court held that the federal disqualification stan-
dards for judges apply to special masters because masters perform duties
functionally equivalent to those ofjudges.42 The conflict in Jenkins arose
Hoekma, supra note 2, at 704. Disqualification creates some administration costs. Id. When it
occurs in a complex case, the burden may be substantial. Id. In addition, litigants can manipulate
disqualification to their advantage or to the disadvantage of their opponents by forum shopping or
causing excessive delays in time and money. Id.
33. 860 F.2d 1168 (2d Cir. 1988).
34. Id. at 1172-74.
35. Id. at 1175. To implement certain backpay orders efficiently, the district court referred the
matters to a master, the Administrator Designee. Id. at 1170. None of the parties objected to the
appointment of the Administrator Designee. Id.
36. Id. at 1178. The Administrator Designee previously represented a union, in an unrelated
action, in which he served as an adversary to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id.
at 1175.
37. Id. at 1174. In addition, in 1978, when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 455, deleting the term "referee in bankruptcy." See Pub. L.
No. 95-598, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5936. Following the reasoning of the Rios court,
Congress at this time should have inserted the term "special masters" if it indeed intended the strict
disqualification standards to apply to them.
38. 860 F.2d at 1174.
39. Id at 1175. The court also found that district courts possess considerable, but acceptable,
discretion in refusing to disqualify masters. Id. at 1175 n.37. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c) & (e)
(district court may reject, modify, or adopt the master's findings).
40. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
41. 849 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir.), petition for reh'g denied, 856 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per
curiam).
42. Id. at 630. Upon dissolution of a law firm, the district court assigned a master to distribute
the firm's profits. Id. at 629. Sterlacci contended that the master's involvement in an unrelated
appeal affected his ability to distribute these profits impartially. Id. at 634 n.7.
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because the master, a law professor and practicing attorney, acted con-
temporaneously in an unrelated action as the opposing attorney to a law
firm that represented a litigant in a hearing before the master.43 Relying
on the language in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals assumed the federal disqualification stan-
dards applied to any officer, including a master, who performed judicial
functions.' The court found the more relaxed standards inappropriate
for special masters because, under Rule 53(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, district courts review special masters' findings of facts
under a "clearly erroneous" standard.45 Because of that deferential re-
view of findings of fact, and because courts frequently appoint special
masters to administer complex issues, the court considered the position
of a special master to be "functionally indistinguishable" from that of a
trial judge.46 In addition, according to the Jenkins court, higher stan-
dards apply to masters because they may serve as advocates in matters
unrelated to their service as masters.47 The court reasoned that the pos-
sibility of dual roles may cast doubt on the objectivity of the special
masters.48
In United States v. Werner,49 the Fourth Circuit held that section
455(a)'s strict disqualification standards apply both to judges and to land
commissioners whom the district court appoints to determine just com-
pensation for land taken in an eminent domain action.50 Noting that
43. Id. at 630. See Silberman, supra note 20, at 2160.
44. 849 F.2d at 631 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(c)(1)). However,
unlike 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988), which is silent on masters and which the court should have used to
determine the standard for any justice, judge or magistrate, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
explicitly provides that a special master or anyone who performs judicial functions is a judge for
purposes of the Code. Silberman, supra note 20, at 2161.
45. 849 F.2d at 631. The court concluded that the district court lacks complete control because
of the standard of review for the findings of fact. Id. at 631.
46. Id. The court recognized that even if a special master's findings went against the district
and appellate court's view of the weight of evidence, the findings would be upheld. Id.
47. Id. at 632. See Silberman, supra note 20, at 2134 (modern-day special masters, either
prominent and experienced practitioners or prestigious academics, are selected from a narrow cir-
cle). The court recognized that an attorney need not completely cease activities as an advocate on
becoming a special master. 849 F.2d at 632. The court thought it necessary, however, that a special
master avoid any undertaking that would "tend to appear to compromise his impartiality as a dci-
sionmaker." Id.
48. Id. at 632. The master appointed by the district court must not serve in an opposing capac-
ity at any time during his service as a master in the pending action. Silberman, supra note 20, at
2134.
49. 916 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1990).
50. Id. at 178.
1992]
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circuits are split on the issue, the court held that lower standards do not
apply because a "court commissioner" is considered a judge by a canon
of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.51 The court viewed the standard
the Code sets as "substantially identical" to section 455(a)'s.52 Thus for
the purposes of section 455, the court considered a land commissioner a
judge.53 In support of its holding, the court looked to the legislative his-
tory of the disqualification statute, which suggested that Congress
amended section 455 to ensure "the statutory grounds for disqualifica-
tion of a judge in a particular case conform generally with the recently
adopted canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct. " 5 4
Furthermore, the court applied a heightened standard because Con-
gress amended section 455 to "promote public confidence in impartiality
of the judicial process."5 5 The court also determined that Congress
amended Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to "insure
that unbiased and competent commissioners are appointed"56 to assist
district courts. The court noted that public confidence in the fairness of
judicial proceedings is vital at all levels, including just-compensation
tribunals." According to the court, applying the heightened disqualifi-
cation standard to land commissioners furthers Congress' goals.
After determining that section 455 governs the disqualification of land
commissioners, the court followed the Jenkins analysis, concluding that
the same disqualification standards apply to judges, special masters, and
land commissioners.5" Because the district court reviews the land com-
missioner's findings of fact under a "clearly erroneous" standard, the
court found that land commissioners perform tasks essentially identical
51. Id. MODEL ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Compliance with the Code of Judicial
Conduct (1972). "[A]nyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system perform-
ing judicial functions, including an officer such as a bankruptcy judge, special master, court commis-
sioner, or magistrate, is a judge for the purpose of this Code." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1) at 1-58. See also Belfiore v. New York Times Co., 826 F.2d 177, 185 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067 (1988) (Model Code of Judicial Conduct applies to special
masters).
52. 916 F.2d at 178.
53. The court agreed with the rationale of the District of Columbia Circuit in Jenkins v.
Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1988), in relying on the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 916 F.2d
at 178.
54. 916 F.2d at 178. See H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 18, at 6352.
55. 916 F.2d at 178 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 18, at 6355).
56. Id. at 178 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 71A advisory committee's note).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
[Vol. 70:243
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to the functions performed by a judge. 9 Thus the court concluded that
land commissioners must be held to the heightened standards set forth in
section 455.61
The Fourth Circuit's application of the disqualification standards of
section 455 to land commissioners in Werner is misplaced. First, the
court downplayed the significance of the recent amendments to section
455.61 Congress has had numerous opportunities to clarify the statute
specifically to include special masters in the section's coverage.62 In ad-
dition, Congress amended section 455 in 1974 generally to comport with
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, but declined specifically to adopt its
language.63 Assuming that Congress composed the statute after much
deliberation and consideration, the exclusion of terms like "special mas-
ters" is an unlikely oversight. Furthermore, if Congress intended to sub-
ject masters and other court appointees to the strict standards applicable
to judges, Congress could have amended the section when it enacted the
Judicial Improvement Act in 1988. 64 The court thus misinterpreted the
intentions of Congress when it subjected land commissioners to the stan-
dards that govern disqualification for judges.65
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Werner also failed to consider fully
the role and importance of land commissioners. Appointed by the dis-
trict court,66 land commissioners possess the powers of special masters
under Rule 53(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.67 Under Rule
71A(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before appointing mem-
bers to the land commission, the court must advise the parties to the
action of the identity and qualifications of each prospective commis-
sioner.68 In addition, a court may permit the parties to examine each
59. Id. at 178. See FED. R. Civ. P. 71A, 53(e)(2).
60. 916 F.2d at 178.
61. See Pub. L. No. 93-512, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351; Pub. L. No. 95-598, re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; Pub. L. No. 100-702, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982.
62. See supra notes 4 and 17.
63. See supra note 19 for text of MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUC.
64. Pub. L. No. 100-702, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6029.
65. See supra notes 16-19. Judges are unambiguously governed by the strict, objective standard
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
66. See FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(h) (the district court, in its discretion, may order that, "because of
the character, location, or quantity of the property to be condemned, or for other reasons in the
interests of justice, the issue of compensation shall be determined by a commission of three persons
appointed by it.").
67. See id.
68. See id. ("before appointing the members of the commission.., the court shall advise the
parties of the identity and qualifications of each prospective commissioner .... ).
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designee, and each party has the right to object for valid cause to the
appointment of any person as commissioner.69 In Werner, no one chal-
lenged Nash's appointment until after the trial and judgment.70 Land
commissioners should not be held to a strict standard when the parties
waive their rights by failing to object to the court's appointment before
the trial begins.
In addition, as masters, land commissioners are under the district
court's plenary control.71 Because judges must comply with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,72 the court possesses full control over masters
charged with determining extremely complicated valuations as well as
those who calculate fairly simple valuations. Under Rule 53(a), the dis-
trict court's considerable control over masters eliminates the need to im-
pose strict disqualification standards.73 Furthermore, a strict standard is
unnecessary because Rule 53(a) adequately establishes safeguards to pro-
tect the judicial system from the biases and conflicts of interests of special
masters.74
Finally, the Fourth Circuit undervalued the importance of the need to
hire individuals with expertise in particular, often specialized areas.75
The need to hire qualified individuals as land commissioners can override
the need to impose higher ethical standards. 6 Individuals qualified to
serve as masters, such as land commissioners, may be small in number,
and there may be few indeed who do not serve as advocates in similar, if
unrelated, matters. 77 A district court should not impede judicial econ-
69. See id.
70. 916 F.2d at 176.
71. See FED. R. CIv. P. 53(e)(2). Each master must complete a report that the court may
adopt, modify, or reject in whole or part after the hearing. The court also may request further
evidence from the master or recommit it with instructions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(5). The
parties are given ample time to object to the choice of the commissioners; thus, the strict standard
regarding disqualification imposed upon judges is not necessary for masters. See FED. R. Civ. P.
71A(h).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("these rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in
all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity .....
73. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
74. Id.
75. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 426 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976). Masters' functions are often very focused: to supervise various pretrial phases of litigation;
to facilitate settlement under a broad charter; to act as a negotiator and conciliator between the
parties; or to assist in shaping, monitoring, or enforcing compliance with post-judgment relief. Sil-
berman, supra note 20, at 2135-36. Use of masters has been extremely valuable in processing the
expanding and complicated litigation in contemporary society. See id. at 2174.
76. 530 F.2d at 426.
77. Cf. Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 688, 860 F.2d 1168 (2d Cir. 1988) (the
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omy by granting a motion to disqualify based on previous or ongoing
relations when no actual bias has been shown.7 8 An attorney may wear
several hats, serving as an advocate for one group, and later serving as a
master.79 Often, the kind of experienced practitioners who may best as-
sist the district court have represented both sides in past actions.80 The
wheels of justice may cease to turn efficiently if a district court must
disqualify any master who fails to maintain the strict standards of impar-
tiality imposed on judges."'
The Werner decision is thus an unfortunate addition to the confusion
surrounding the applicable disqualification standards for land commis-
sioners. Congress should clarify section 455 and draft guidelines for the
correct interpretation of the standards governing land commissioners.
Until Congress addresses the issue, however, courts should refrain from
subjecting both masters and commissioners and the efficiency of justice to
the heightened disqualification standards applicable to judges.
Paula D. Hunt
administrator was highly qualified for the position of master, yet it was unavoidable that an attorney
of such experience will have represented both workers and unions in EEOC enforcement actions).
78. See supra note 32.
79. Silberman, supra note 20, at 2160 (quoting Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 632 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (depending upon the professional function he is performing from one day to the next, a
master may wear different hats)).
80. See supra note 77.
81. Of course, no court should refuse to grant a motion to disqualify if it anticipates that a
special master has tainted the proceedings.
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